Family office cybersecurity isn't a scaled-down corporate model. Learn why the three-perimeter problem demands a different approach for UHNW families.
A family office should approach cybersecurity the way it approaches audit and tax: an independent assessment first, a documented program second, and an accountable owner throughout. How to use the frameworks, turn findings into a program with named owners, and choose specialists for the gaps frameworks leave by category and criteria rather than by brand.
A family office employs a handful of people and depends on several dozen. CISA's definition of an insider turns on access rather than employment, which means the household staff, the contractors and the advisors' assistants are already inside it. Why the motive question is the wrong place to start, and what a consequence map, engagement terms and ten minutes of role-specific instruction actually change.
A family office can harden its own systems and still send the family’s most sensitive documents to personal accounts it does not control, where they accumulate for years. Why that archive matters, and what to change: send links rather than attachments, protect the accounts that receive what remains, and agree the channels in advance.
